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Abstract
Recent progress in artificial intelligence provides the opportunity to ask the question of
what is unique about human intelligence, but with a new comparison class. I argue that we
can understand human intelligence, and the ways in which it may di er from artificial
intelligence, by considering the characteristics of the kind of computational problems that
human minds have to solve. I claim that these problems acquire their structure from three
fundamental limitations that apply to human beings: limited time, limited computation,
and limited communication. From these limitations we can derive many of the properties
we associate with human intelligence, such as rapid learning, the ability to break down
problems into parts, and the capacity for cumulative cultural evolution.
Keywords: artificial intelligence, inductive bias, metalearning, rational metareasoning,
cultural evolution
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Understanding Human Intelligence through Human Limitations
Di erent Computational Problems, Di erent Kinds of Intelligence
As machines begin to outperform humans on an increasing number of tasks, it is
natural to ask what is unique about human intelligence. Historically, this has been a
question that is asked when comparing humans to other animals. The classical answer
(from Aristotle, via the Scholastics) is to view humans as “rational animals” – animals that
think [18]. More modern analyses of human uniqueness emphasize the “cognitive niche”
that humans fill, able to use their minds to outsmart the biological defenses of their
competitors [43], or contrast this with the “cultural niche” of being able to accumulate
knowledge across individuals and generations in a way that makes it possible to live in an
unusually diverse range of environments [10, 25, 26]. Asking the same question of what
makes humans unique, but changing the contrast class to include intelligent machines,
yields a very di erent kind of answer.
In this article I argue that even as we develop potentially superhuman machines,
there is going to be a flavor of intelligence that remains uniquely human. To understand
the nature of human intelligence, we need to understand the kinds of computational
problems that human minds have to solve. David Marr [37], Roger Shepard [48], and John
Anderson [2] all converged on a productive strategy for making sense of specific aspects of
human cognition: attempting to understand the abstract computational problem
underlying that aspect of cognition, and using its ideal solution to gain insight into why
people do the things they do. For Marr this was the “computational level” of analysis, for
Shepard a way to try to identify universal laws of cognition, and for Anderson a component
of “rational analysis”. This approach has since been pursued in order to gain insight into a
wide range of problems, including reasoning [42], generalization [53], categorization [3, 5],
and causal learning [22]. However, these applications all focus on particular computational
problems, rather than asking what the characteristics are of the kinds of computational
problems that human minds need to solve in general.
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Following the same approach with this wider lens, we can ask what it is that is
common across all of the computational problems that humans encounter. I suggest that
the set of human computational problems all share three important characteristics:
1. Humans have a limited amount of time. Nature may only provide limited
opportunities to learn behaviors relevant to survival and the length of human lives
imposes an upper bound on the amount of available data.
2. Humans have access to a limited amount of computation. Each human being has a
single brain with fixed computational capacity.
3. Humans minds have limited communication. Human beings have no way to directly
transfer the contents of their brain to one another.
The constraints imposed by these characteristics cascade: limited time magnifies the e ect
of limited computation, and limited communication makes it harder to draw upon more
computation.
While these same constraints apply to cognition in all animals, not just humans, it is
worth noting that this is not the case for all intelligent systems. Recent breakthroughs in
AI have been driven by an exponential increase in the amount of computation being used
to solve problems [1], and it has become common for these systems to be provided
experience that is equivalent of many human lifetimes. The results of learning in one
system can be copied directly to another, making it possible to train a single system
through experiences acquired in parallel. Each of these three characteristics of human
problems thus reflects a human limitation (see Figure 1).
The recent successes of artificial intelligence research have initiated a discussion of
how current AI systems di er from human intelligence. The key di erences that have been
highlighted include the ability to learn from small amounts of data and the use of
structured representations [34]. Rather than reiterating this discussion, my goal is to shift
the emphasis from how to why: why do these properties of human intelligence exist?
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Figure 1 . Schematic depiction of computational problems potentially faced by humans and
machines. Human minds solve a set of problems that are a specific subset of those
potentially faced by artificial intelligence systems, resulting from limited time,
computation, and communication.
Identifying these properties as a consequence of the nature of the computational problems
that human minds have to solve helps to clarify when we might want AI systems to have
the same properties: when they face the same constraints as humans.
Understanding human intelligence via human limitations is also helpful for identifying
the formal tools that will be most relevant to cognitive science. In the spirit of Marr,
Shepard and Anderson, we can ask what the ideal solutions to human computational
problems look like. Each of these limitations imposes its own structure on problems, with a
corresponding set of mathematical tools required to solve them. Limited time means
being able to make inferences from limited data, so formalisms such as Bayesian inference
that allow us to characterize the inductive biases of learners are valuable. Limited
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computation requires that that computation be used e ciently, making a connection to the
literature on rational meta-reasoning in artificial intelligence. Limited communication
implies that solving problems that go beyond the computational or temporal limits of those
individuals requires developing mechanisms for cumulative cultural evolution, for which the
relevant formalisms come from parallel and distributed algorithms.
If the goal of cognitive science is to understand human intelligence, and the
intelligence of entities that operate under similar constraints, it will require making use of
each of these tools. While dealing with these constraints is a necessary component of
understanding human cognition, it is also desirable characteristic for artificial intelligence
systems. Understanding how human minds navigate these constraints is thus potentially
also relevant to developing systems capable of learning quickly, thinking e ciently, and
communicating about the results (see Box 1 for further discussion).
In the remainder of the article I discuss each human limitation and their cascading
consequences in further detail.
Limitation 1: Time
Limited time means having to learn from limited amounts of data. There are at least
three timescales at which human learning has to operate, reflecting di erent kinds of
constraints: timescales imposed by survival, timescales imposed by the explore/exploit
tradeo , and timescales imposed by the absolute limits of the human lifespan.
The first timescale appears in cases where the limits on the time available to learn are
imposed by the need to survive. Humans who required thousands of examples in order to
be able to reliably identify a tiger would not have survived in environments where hungry
black and orange beasts abound. Being able to quickly learn to identify di erent animals,
plants, and other natural categories has been, at least in an evolutionary sense, an
important part of the computational problems that humans face. In this context, the
capacity to learn from limited data is comparable to the ability of baby gazelles to run
shortly after birth – a consequence of the limited time available to build up the requisite
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skills for survival.
The second timescale that a ects human learning is an indirect consequence of the
length of human lives. Many of the problems that humans have to solve require navigating
the explore/exploit trade-o  [28]. Faced with situations we are likely to encounter again in
the future, we have to decide whether to take actions that may provide useful information
(explore) or instead take the action we know is most likely to result in a good outcome
(exploit). A key variable in the decision about whether to explore or exploit is how many
more times we will make similar decisions: the value of information increases the more
opportunities we will have to use it [6]. We should thus expect people to switch from
exploration to exploitation with age, an idea that has been proposed as a way of
understanding human childhood [19].
Crucially, the point at which we switch from exploration – learning about our world –
to exploitation – using that knowledge – will depend on the total length of our lifespan.
The longer we live, the greater the value of information provided by exploration, and the
longer it makes sense to explore. So, the length of human lifespans imposes a natural scale
on the length of many of the learning problems we face: even when our environment a ords
us the luxury of time to learn, there is a natural limit on the amount of data we will have
access to in order to learn the skills that are essential to our lives as adults.
Finally, the third timescale is an even more direct consequence of our limited lifespan.
Even when we have the luxury of spending our entire lives learning, the maximum amount
of data we can learn from is that which can be accumulated through in a single lifetime.
Whatever we learn must be acquired in (significantly) less than a million hours of real-time
experience.
It is by no means necessary that machines operate under the same constraints.
Learning from less data may save money, but the amount of data available to machine
learning systems is fundamentally a function of how much data has being collected in that
domain and the goals of the person building the system. The AlphaGo system that beat
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one of the best human players in history had the benefit of multiple human lifetimes of
simulated play [49]. The most successful neural network language model, GPT-3, was
recently trained on over 400 billion tokens of text [11]. Assuming speech at a rate of 150
words per minute, that’s how many words would be produced speaking continuously since
the reign of the earliest Egyptian pharaohs over 5000 years ago. However, there are
settings where being able to learn from small amounts of data is important. One example
is in sciences where data is very limited, such as particle physics or cosmology [12].
Another example is building software systems that have to adapt to individual users, where
new users may decide whether or not to adopt a system based on how quickly it learns
from their behavior [8]. More generally, in interactions with humans – where expectations
about the speed of learning are set by other humans – there is pressure to quickly learn
new tasks or concepts from examples [24]. In these settings, we might expect machine
learning systems to be more similar to human learning (see Box 1).
The mathematical tools most useful for making the best use of limited time are those
that help us understand the inductive biases of learners. In machine learning, inductive
bias is defined as anything other than the data that influences the conclusion the system
reaches [39]. A reinforcement learning system that establishes how to move the joints of a
robot through trial and error is relying on data to get there, while a newborn gazelle is
making strong use of inductive bias. To be able to learn from less data, a system needs
inductive biases that point towards the right solutions.
Abstractly, humans and machines both face the challenge of acquiring enough
knowledge about the world around them in order to produce intelligent action. What di ers
between human learning and machine learning is the variables that can be manipulated in
order to achieve that goal. For machines, data is typically flexible. How much data is
available to learn from depends mostly on the budget for solving the problem, and recent
research in deep learning has succeeded in part by massively increasing the amount of data
available to learners [1]. Getting more data is often easier – and more successful – than
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trying to engineer good inductive biases, something that has been termed the “bitter
lesson” [52]. For humans, data is typically fixed.1 We have to learn from the data available
to us, and the only way to do so is to establish good inductive biases. The project of the
cognitive scientist, then, becomes one of trying to reverse-engineer these inductive biases.
Bayesian inference provides one tool for exploring inductive biases, using di erent
prior distributions as an explicit means of characterizing the predispositions of learners
[21]. Bayesian models of cognition can thus be used to evaluate hypotheses about human
inductive biases. Machine learning systems that learn from massive amounts of data can
also be informative about human inductive biases. One way of understanding how people
are able to learn from limited data is by viewing evolution as providing the equivalent of
“pre-training” on a larger data set. Machine learning methods are thus solving in a single
learning step a problem that for humans has been broken into separate parts, one solved by
evolution and the other by learning. Recent work in machine learning on metalearning,
which is a framework for learning an appropriate inductive bias through experience,
provides a way to see how these parts could be separated again (see Box 2).
Limitation 2: Computation
Limited time is a concern not just for the amount of data the learner gets exposed to,
but for the amount of computation that can be expended in solving a problem. When
faced with limited time, computer scientists will often increase the amount of computation
devoted to a problem. However, humans do not have access to that solution. Equipped
with a brain with fixed processing power, we have to use these limited resources to solve all
of the problems that we encounter.
This limitation sets up a new kind of problem: how do we make the best use of our
limited computational resources? A key attribute of human intelligence is being able to
break problems into parts that can individually be solved more easily, or that make it
1That said, human minds work hard to make the best use of the limited time available to them, actively
selecting the data that they learn from whenever they can [23].
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possible to reuse partial solutions discovered through previous experience. These methods
for making computational problems more tractable such ubiquitous part of human
intelligence that they seem to be an obligatory component of intelligence more generally.
One example of this is forming subgoals. The early artificial intelligence literature, inspired
by human problem-solving, put a significant emphasis on reducing tasks to a series of
subgoals [41]. However, forming subgoals is not a necessary part of intelligence, it’s a
consequence of having limited computation. With a su ciently large amount of
computation, there is no need to have subgoals: the problem can be solved by simply
planning all the way to the final goal. Go experts have commented that new AI systems
sometimes produce play that seems alien, precisely because it was hard to identify goals
that motivated particular actions [13]. This makes perfect sense, since the actions that
taken by these systems are justified by the fact that they are most likely to yield a small
expected advantage many steps in the future rather than because they satisfy some specific
subgoal.
Another example where human intelligence looks very di erent from machine
intelligence is in solving the Rubik’s cube. Thanks to some careful analysis and a
significant amount of computation, the Rubik’s cube is a solved problem: the shortest path
from any configuration to an unscrambled cube has been identified, taking no more than 20
moves [45]. However, the solution doesn’t have a huge amount of underlying structure –
those shortest paths are stored in a gigantic lookup table. Contrast this with the solutions
used by human solvers. A variety of methods for solving the cube exist, but those used by
the fastest human solvers require around 50 moves. These solutions require memorizing a
few dozen to a few hundred “algorithms” that specify transformations to be used at
particular points in the process. Methods also have intermediate subgoals, such as first
solving an entire side. While human solutions may take longer to execute, they are far
more e cient to describe and implement, being able to be summarized in a short booklet.
As these examples make clear, human intelligence reflects an expertise in finding
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solutions to problems that can be implemented with the limited amount of computation
contained inside a single human brain. The search for solutions to problems that trade o 
speed or accuracy with the cost of computation can be formalized using an idea originally
introduced in the AI literature: rational meta-reasoning [27, 46]. If reasoning is solving a
problem, meta-reasoning is solving the problem of how to solve the problem – in this case,
working out how to solve problems using limited amounts of computation. Rational
meta-reasoning explores what optimal solutions to these meta-reasoning problems look like
(see Box 3). In AI, this provides a way to characterize e ective strategies for systems that
need to reduce responses under time constraints, relevant to applications such as driving or
healthcare. However, rational meta-reasoning may be even more valuable for understanding
the solutions to computational problems that characterize human intelligence [35, 36].
Limitation 3: Communication
Limited time and computation need not be major constraints if it is possible to solve
problems in serial or parallel. For example, being eaten by a tiger may not be a bad
outcome for an intelligent system if it is able to transfer the data it has acquired to another
instance of that system, e ectively increasing the amount of experience each system gets
over time. Likewise, limited computation is not necessarily an issue if a problem can be
broken up into components that are distributed across many processes and then aggregated
into a solution. The problem is that both serial and parallel computation require
information to be shared between processors, and human brains have no direct interfaces
for copying information in this way: the experiences of each individual are encapsulated
within their brain.
Limited communication results in a third key component of human intelligence:
mechanisms that support cumulative cultural evolution. When humans need to solve a
problem that transcends the limits of individual lifespans or computational power, we
develop cultural institutions that allow us to accumulate the results of individual learning
and action [10]. Joining together in groups that support division of labor allows some
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individuals to specialize and thus learn from more data. Using pictures or writing allows us
to communicate information beyond a single lifespan. These same principles are behind the
formation of modern corporations and scientific journals.
At a more basic level, key components of human intelligence can be seen as a
consequence of limited communication. Teaching is one example: if individual learners
have a limited amount of time in which to learn, then making sure that they are provided
with the very best data is a way to expand their capacity. Language is another, being a
system that allows us to come closer to copying information across brains. A human Go
player potentially has access to more than a single lifespan of play through the
documentation and discussion of what has been learned about the game by previous
generations. Even under a richer view of language as a mechanism for coordination and
negotiation [15], an implicit premise is that the states of the agents coordinating and
negotiating are not transparent to one another. The compositional structure of language
has itself been suggested to be a consequence of having limited time in which to transfer
knowledge from one brain to another [30, 31].
While there has been significant interest in topics such as teaching and the emergence
of language in artificial intelligence research (e.g., [40, 56]), these need only be a property
of AI systems if encapsulated agents are necessary. The capacity to directly transfer data
or states of computation from one machine to another, or to have a single intelligence
control multiple bodies [9] means that it is perfectly reasonable to have AI systems that
aren’t subject to this kind of constraint. As a consequence, such systems might be
expected to omit these aspects of human intelligence.
The formal tools required to understand cumulative cultural evolution come from yet
another part of computer science: the study of distributed computation. Cognitive
scientists are used to analyzing computational problems expressed at the level of
individuals, but we can apply the same lens at the level of groups or societies. Thinking
about a group of people jointly solving a computational problem allows us to ask what
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algorithms might be e ective for solving that problem, under the constraint that those
algorithms have to be executed by a distributed set of processors (individual humans) [32].
For example, probabilistic inference – trying to compute a Bayesian posterior distribution
over the true state of the world – can be executed as a serial computation across the
sequence of agents each of whom gathers some data about the environment [7], or as a
parallel computation across a group of agents [33]. The literature on distributed algorithms
for solving the kinds of computational problems that groups of humans have to solve is
likely to yield new insights into how human minds transcend some of the limits of time and
computation under which they operate (see Box 4).
Concluding Remarks
The intersection of the limitations of time, computation, and communication define a
set of computational problems at a very specific human scale. To the extent that human
minds are adapted to solve such problems, these limitations potentially provide insight into
the nature of human intelligence (but see Outstanding Questions). If AI systems are not
operating under all of these constraints, then we might expect those systems to not exhibit
traits that we associate with human intelligence. This doesn’t mean that they are not
intelligent systems, just that they instantiate a di erent flavor of intelligence that is shaped
by a di erent set of computational problems. Understanding the human flavor of
intelligence is going to require a particular set of mathematical tools, with Bayesian
inference and metalearning, rational metareasoning, and parallel algorithms being of
particular relevance to the project of cognitive science.
The limitations that shape human intelligence also provide a way to answer the
question of what makes humans unique in a world where machines are becoming
increasingly intelligent. These limitations are largely a consequence of being biological
organisms, and are shared by all vertebrates. Asking the question of what makes humans
unique, but changing the contrast class from animals to machines suggests that perhaps we
can recycle the classical answer with a corresponding change in emphasis: rather than
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being animals that think, we are animals that think.
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Box 1: When do machines need to be like humans?
As should be clear from Figure 1, I am not arguing that the computational problems
faced by humans and those potentially faced by machines are completely disjoint; rather,
that human problems are a specific subset of potential machine problems that result from
the intersection of three limitations. A natural question is then what kind of machines
encounter that same subset. The main text highlights some contexts where learning from
limited data may be necessary – certain scientific applications, or settings that require
interacting with people. Likewise, systems that need to make timely decisions might
potentially draw inspiration from people. Finally, systems that need to coordinate with
limited communication may need something like language or teaching. But when do
machines need to confront all three human limitations simultaneously?
Viewed from the perspective of an engineer, humans are a very specific kind of
system: a self-contained autonomous system capable of real-time performance of a wide
range of tasks. We carry our own power supply, operate without external control, do so in
time-critical settings, and are able to navigate, find energy sources, make inferences about
our environment, and execute precision movements. Each of these aspects of humans –
being autonomous, real-time, and general-purpose – is an engineering challenge, and it is
usually possible to design a machine that performs a task without having to overcome
these challenges. As a consequence, most machines don’t face the particular configuration
of computational problems that humans do.
This doesn’t mean that there are no use cases for machines that align well with those
of humans. One example is space exploration, where we might seek to create autonomous
probes that are able to gather data to make intelligent inferences and actions while
preserving limited power, with low bandwidth and high latency for communications. Such
a system faces many of the same limitations as humans, and might be expected to have
similar characteristics. Indeed, each human birth launches a probe into a universe full of
potential new discoveries.
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Box 2: Metalearning, Bayes, and evolution
An active topic of research in machine learning is “metalearning,” or learning to learn
[47, 54]. Rather than optimizing an agent to perform a single task, meta-learning focuses
on optimizing agents to quickly learn to perform a range of tasks that have some shared
structure (see Figure I). E ectively, this approach aims to learn an inductive bias that is
appropriate for the distribution of tasks that the agent encounters. This can be done in a
variety of ways, including using a recurrent neural network to learn regularities in strategies
across tasks [16, 55] or optimizing performance across tasks using the same gradient
descent algorithms used for learning within tasks [4, 17, 44]. Learning an inductive bias in
this way is similar to learning a prior distribution for Bayesian inference, a relationship
that can be made exact for a least one popular approach to metalearning [20].
Metalearning algorithms typically consist of an “inner loop” in which a set of agents
learns to perform di erent tasks and an “outer loop” in which the inductive biases of those
agents are tuned to improve their inner-loop performance. For example, one popular
algorithm, Model-Agnostic Meta-Learning (MAML) [17], minimizes the following objective
function
L(◊) =ÿ
t
Lt(„t) „t = ◊ ≠ –Ò◊Lt(◊) (1)
where ◊ is the initial weights of an artificial neural network, Lt(„t) is the loss (error) of a
neural network with weights „t on task t, and „t = ◊ ≠ –Ò◊Lt(◊) are the weights obtained
after one step of gradient descent initialized with ◊ with learning rate –. Calculating „t is
the “inner loop” of learning, and finding ◊ is the “outer loop” that optimizes the inductive
bias – here in the form of the initialization ◊.
This decomposition of agent performance into two separate optimization problems
resembles the decomposition of human behavior into ontogenetic and phylogenetic
processes – learning and evolution. The outer-loop optimization is the problem that
evolutionary processes address, tuning the characteristics of organisms based on the
environments that those organisms will encounter. This tuning only makes sense if the
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amount of data available in the inner loop is fixed – if learners have limited time, as
depicted in the figure. Indeed, the primary application for meta-learning algorithms is
trying to reduce the amount of data learners require to perform a new task.
Viewed in this way, metalearning may also o er a unique tool for exploring human
inductive biases. By providing a way to impart learners with inductive biases that are
su cient to solve a particular set of learning problems, these algorithms potentially allow
us to explore what kinds of inductive biases are necessary to reach human-level solutions
from human-limited data (for a preliminary example of this approach, see [38]).
Biases Data 
Biases Data 
Biases 
Data1 
Biases Data2 
Biases 
Data3 
Machine learning 
flexible 
Human learning 
fixed 
Metalearning 
learned across datasets 
fixed within datasets 
Figure I. Di erent regimes for learning. In machine learning, there is typically some
flexibility about the amount of data available to the learner. This contrasts with human
learning, where the total amount of data available is limited. Meta-learning provides a way
to bridge these paradigms, optimizing inductive bias across a large number of distinct
datasets, each limited in size.
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Box 3: Rational metareasoning and the human paradox
Anybody who talks to both psychologists and computer scientists can come away
with a paradoxical view of human nature: humans disappoint psychologists as error-prone
decision-makers who often act irrationally, but inspire computer scientists with their ability
to e ciently solve a remarkably wide range of problems. One way to resolve this paradox is
to recognize that both of these attributes stem from having limited computational
resources. Those limits mean that humans have to follow heuristic strategies that result in
errors [29, 50]. However, they also mean that humans have had to develop a finely-honed
ability to deploy the limited resources that we have as e ectively as possible.
Rational metareasoning provides a framework for answering the question of how a
rational agent should deploy limited resources [27, 46]. The classic characterization of
rationality in terms of maximizing expected utility tells us how we should take actions in
the external world. Rational metareasoning focuses on our inner world, telling us what
computations we should execute in order to obtain the information that we need to decide
how to act, trading o  the costs of the errors we might make with the costs of executing
those computations. As such, it provides an excellent framework in which to ask the
questions of cognitive psychology, which are typically more about our internal processes
than our external actions (for a review see [35]).
More formally, the classical approach to rationality emphasizes maximizing expected
utility. The goal of the agent is thus to maximize Ep(x|a)(u(x)) across actions a, where
p(x|a) is the probability of outcome x under action a and u(x) is its utility. This is
fundamentally a “behaviorist” notion of rationality, insofar as it focuses on the action the
agent takes and not how the agent decides that action is appropriate. The rational
metareasoner instead maximizes maxa Epc(x|a)(u(x))≠ cost(c) over computations c, where
pc(x|a) is the estimate of the probability of x yielded by those computations and cost(c) is
their cost. Maximizing over computations focuses on the cognitive processes behind a
decision.
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Rational metareasoning also provides a framework for thinking about how to create
artificial intelligence systems that are capable of the same flexibility as humans. Building
artificial general intelligence requires training artificial intelligence systems on a range of
tasks that has the same generality as those executed by humans. Part of the way that
humans achieve that generality is by being able to reuse knowledge or subroutines that
they have acquired when performing one task in service of performing another. This can be
reduced to a decision about which of a learned set computations to execute when solving a
problem – rational metareasoning [14].
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Box 4: Algorithms for cumulative cultural evolution
Broadly speaking, humans face two kinds of problems that require resources that go
beyond the limitations of individual brains: inference and optimization. Inference – trying
to discover the truth about an aspect of the world – requires aggregating data that go
beyond the experience of one individual. An example is science: no single human has
personal experience of the entire history of experimental work in a given field, so we need
to develop mechanisms that allow us to aggregate that knowledge. Optimization – trying
to develop better solutions to a problem – involves computational resources that are
greater than a single human mind. An example is technological development: each
technology accretes innovations made by many di erent people.
Inference and optimization are also at the heart of many of the problems we want our
computers to solve, and as a consequence there is an extensive literature on algorithms for
solving these problems. Some of these algorithms are designed for exactly the situation
that humans face: many processors, each of which has limited capacity, requiring
parallelization of a challenging computation. These parallel algorithms may provide a rich
source of inspiration for understanding human intelligence, and in particular how we are
able to accumulate knowledge across individuals and generations.
One concrete example is the particle filter, an algorithm that parallelizes elements of
Bayesian inference. One of the properties of Bayesian inference is that “yesterday’s
posterior is todays prior,” meaning that the process of iteratively updating beliefs in light
of evidence can be expresed as repeated applications of Bayes’ rule. More formally,
p(h|d1, . . . , dn) Ã p(dn|h)p(h|d1, . . . , dn≠1) (2)
where p(h|d1, . . . , dn) is the posterior probability of h after observing data d1, . . . , dn,
p(dn|h) is the probability of dn under h, and p(h|d1, . . . , dn≠1) is the posterior probability of
h after observing data d1, . . . , dn≠1 (and we assume d1, . . . , dn are conditionally independent
of one another given h).
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The particle filter takes advantage of this structure. In this algorithm, we begin with
a set of hypotheses sampled from p(h|d1, . . . , dn≠1). As each piece of data is observed those
hypotheses are assigned a weight based on how well they explain the observed data,
reflected in p(dn|h). Then, a new set of hypotheses is sampled from this set, giving higher
probability to those of other theories that have higher weight. The result is a set of
samples that approximate the posterior distribution p(h|d1, . . . , dn).
To translate this to an algorithm for cultural evolution, we assume each person
entertains a single hypothesis and equate the sampling process with the choice by the next
generation of people of who to learn from, as shown in Figure II. The success of the
previous generation in explaining observed data is determined by p(dn|h), and we assume
that more successful individuals are more likely to be chosen to learn from. he hypotheses
maintained by each generation will represent samples from the Bayesian posterior
distribution. For a direct application of this approach in cultural evolution, see [33]. For a
more detailed articulation of the parallels between evolutionary dynamics and the particle
filter, see [51].
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samples from 
P(h|d1,…,dn-1) 
weight  
by 
P(dn|h) 
weighted atoms 
P(h|d1,…,dn) 
samples from 
P(h|d1,…,dn) 
beliefs of 
generation n-1 
success 
reflects 
P(dn|h) 
influence 
beliefs of 
generation n 
Particle filter Cultural evolution 
Figure II. Analogies between parallel algorithms and cumulative cultural evolution. The
particle filter is an algorithm for approximating the iterative update of a probability
distribution by Bayesian inference. As described in the text, its components map directly
to a population of individuals influencing the beliefs of next generation. Sampled
hypotheses become the beliefs of individuals, And the process of assigning weights to those
samples become the influence that individuals have when determining the beliefs of the
next generation.
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